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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXIV FEBRUARY, 1939 NUMBER 2
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE INDE.
PENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
ROBERT E. CUSHMAN
II. RELATIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS TO CONGRESS, TO THE PRESIDENT
AND TO THE COURTS
The status of the regulatory commissions cannot be charted in terms of
neat categories derived from the theory of separation of powers. The com-
missions are hybrids; but they are not unconstitutional. There remains the
task of analyzing their constitutional relations to each of the three branches
of government. What kinds of control may Congress, the President and the
courts exercise over them? What limits are there upon the scope and methods
of that control? The doctrine of the separation of powers is a factor in
answering these questions; but it is not the only factor, and it is convenient
to group these practical and concrete problems together.
A. CONGRESS AND TEE COMMISSIONS
1. Power to create and to regulate functions and procedure
Congress has the power to create independent regulatory agencies. Not
only has it set up a good many but it shows signs of continuing to create
them. In the 75th Congress more than a hundred bills were introduced pro-
posing new independent establishments, of which at least a dozen were to
exercise quasi-judicial power.- In creating an office or agency, independent
or not, Congress may specify in great detail the duties to be exercised and
the procedure to be followed. The statutes governing the Securities and
Exchange Commission show how far this process may be pushed.
The power of Congress does not stop here. It may exercise a rather clumsy
continuing control in three ways. First, it may pass statutes or resolutions
directing the commissions to pursue certain policies or take certain actions
in specific situations. A notable example of this was the Hoch-Smith Reso-
lution of 1925,2 which directed the Interstate Commerce Commission in
*This is the second and final installment of this article, the first having appeared in
(1938) 24 CORNELL LAW QuARTERLY 13.-Ed.
"DIGEST OF PUBLIC GENERAL BiLs, No. 9 and Supplement to No..9, Legislative Refer-
ence Service, Library of Congress, 1938.
2Joint Resolution of January 30, 1925, 43 STAT. 801. For comment see 1 SEARFMAN,
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establishing a rate structure to consider the conditions in various industries
and, specifically, to lower rates on agricultural commodities. In 1922 Congress,
under pressure from organizations of commercial travellers, passed a statute
requiring the Commission to issue interchangeable mileage books at "just
and reasonable rates".3 The Commission's order complying with this statute
was held void by the Supreme Court but without prejudice to the power
of Congress to pass statutes directing Commission action.4 There are numer-
ous cases in which Congress orders a commission to conduct some special
investigation on its behalf or to recommend legislative changes, and this is
one of the purposes for which the commissions were created. 5 In the main,
however, Congress has confined itself to the giving or taking away of powers,
and has not tried to direct a commission how to use its powers in particular
situations. Unless these congressional directions are so arbitrary or discrim-
inatory as to deny due process of law, there is no constitutional objection
to them, no matter how bad they may be on grounds of policy.- The power
exercised is the same as that by which the duties of the commission were
originally defined. We may assume, however, in the absence of judicial
precedent, that an attempt by Congress to control a commission's exercise
of its quasi-judicial power in a specific case would be a violation of due
process of law.
Second, Congress holds the purse strings. Approval or disapproval of a
commission's work may be tangibly expressed in the congressional treat-
ment of its budget. Mr. Brandeis, testifying before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 1914, declared that Congress should
control the proposed, Federal Trade Commission by regulating its appropria-
tions.6 It is a well known fact that almost the only scrutiny the independent
commissions get as to their efficiency is by the appropriations committees,
a scrutiny, incidentally, which is irregular and inadequate. That this power
may be used by Congress to deal with concrete situations is shown by the
rider attached to the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill in 1925 for-
bidding the use by the Federal Trade Commission for certain investigations
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSSION (1931) 227 ff.; and HERRING, PUBLIC AD-
MINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1936) 196.
3Act of August 18, 1922, 42 STAT. 827. 1 SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 226.
"United States v. New York Central R. R., 263 U. S. 603 (1924).
'Cf. the provision requiring the Federal Communications Commission in its annual
report to make "such recommendations as to additional legislation . . . as the Coi-
mission may deem necessary; Provided, that the Commission shall make a special report
not later than February 1, 1935, recommending such amendments to this Act as it deemns
desirable in the public interest." Act of June 19, 1934, 48 STAT. 1064, Title I, § 4 (k).
"'The discretionary power should be vested in the commission. Congress can exercise
its control by limiting the appropriation." Hearings before House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 63d. Cong., 2d. Sess. (1914) 10.
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of business activity of any of the funds appropriated. Here again, while
Congress may abuse its power, there can be no doubt that it has it.
Third, Congress may exert control over a commission by legislating its
members out of office. The Radio Commission was set up in 1927.8 In 1928
Congress enacted that the terms of the commissioners should expire in
February, 1929. Another year's lease of life was given the commission in
1929 and later in the same year it was continued "until such time as is
otherwise provided for by law". 9 While the commissioners were cafried
along by reappointment they were kept year after year on probation. In 1930
Congress "reorganized" the Federal Tariff Commission by terminating by
law the terms of the commissioners in office. 10 A partial change in personnel
was thus brought about through a new set of Presidential appointments.
In the case of agencies whose members can be removed by the President
only for cause, this is the only legal way to secure a complete change in
personnel at one time.
2. Commission as "Arms of Congress"--Does this describe a legal
relationship?
A common formula describes the independent regulatory commissions as
"arms of Congress". The expression is used by members of the commissions
and by members of Congress." Mr. Justice Sutherland was apparently
expressing the same idea when he referred to the Federal Trade Commission
as "an agency of Congress".' 2 There would be no point in discussing the
use of such a term, were it not for the fact that those who use it seem to
imply that it describes a peculiarly close relationship to Congress and a
peculiar degree of independence from Presidential control.
We may readily agree that the commissions are "arms of Congress" in
the sense that they do things which Congress itself might do had it the time
and expert knowledge. We have already covered this ground. The com-
missions make numerous fact-finding investigations upon the basis of which
Congress may legislate. Some of them have rate-making powers, which we
'Act of March 3, 1925, 43 STAT. 1203. See HERRING, op. cit. supra note 2, at 127.
'Act of February 23, 1927, 44 STAT. 1162.
'Act of March 28, 1928, 45 STAT. 373; Act of March 4, 1929, 45 STAT. 1559; Act of
Dec. 18, 1929, 46 STAT. 50.
1The statute provided for a Tariff Commission (composed of six commissioners) "to
be hereafter appointed by the President by and with the consent of the Senate, but each
member now in office shall continue to serve until his successor (as designated by the
President at the time of nomination) takes office, but in no event for longer than [to
September 16, 1930]." Act of June 17, 1930, 46 STAT. 590, 696.
n"The Commission is, primarily, an arm of Congress." Statement of Commissioner
Joseph B. Eastman, referring to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Hearings before
the Select Committee on Government Organization, 75th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1937) 1Y9.
See similar statement in Report of House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce in 1912, auoted in first part of this article at p. 13.
"Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 628, 630 (1935).
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have already seen are "legislative" in character and could be exercised directly
by Congress. 13 There is no constitutional reason why Congress itself should
not by special statute issue radio station licenses or grant ship subsidies in-
stead of giving these tasks to the Federal Communications Commission and
the United States Maritime Commission.
But the regulatory commissions have functions which could not constitu-
tionally be performed by a legislative body. Congress may define by statute
an "unfair method of competition" or an "unfair labor practice", but it can-
not issue a cease and desist order forbidding an individual to continue such
a practice. Congress cannot do the judicial work of the Interstate Commerce
Commission in reparations cases. Nor can it perform the executive work
of the same commission in enforcing the Safety Appliance Acts, or the
managerial work of the Maritime Commission in the handling of construction
and operating subsidies for shipping. Nor can we dismiss the important
judicial, quasi-judicial, and executive functions performed by most of the
commissions as being "incidental" to their "quasi-legislative" duties, as Mr.
Justice Sutherland dismissed the executive duties performed by the Federal
Trade Commission.' 4 It is clear that "arms of Congress" do things which
Congress could not do.
Finally, no task has ever been given to an independent regulatory com-
mission which could not, with equal constitutional propriety, have been given
to an executive officer. Extensive quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers
have long been given to executive officers, and over forty regulatory stat-
utes involving the use of such powers are administered in the Department
of Agriculture alone.' 5 We have seen that under the Packers and Stockyards
Act the Secretary of. Agriculture fixes rates and suppresses unfair competi-
.tive practices, exercising the same power, and using virtually the same
procedure, as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade
Commission.16 Two years ago Chief Justice Hughes declared that the Sec-
retary was performing a "legislative" function, as he was acting as "an agent
of Congress". 17 Presumably, then, he too is an "arm of Congress".
In short, in any common sense meaning of the term, "an arm of Congress"
"See first part of this article at p. 27.1 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 628 (1935).
"&These are set out in Blachly, Working Papers on Administrative Adjudication.
Printed for Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 3d Sess. (1938). This valuable
document gives an exhaustive compilation and analysis of all cases in which quasi-judicial tasks have been assigned either to independent agencies or to executive officers.
"'See first part of this article at p. 36.
""'The proceeding is not one of ordinary administration, conformable to the standards
governing duties of a purely executive character. It is a proceeding looking to legislative
action in the fixing of rates of market agencies .... The Secretary, as the agent of
Congress in making the rates, must make them in accordance with the standards and
under the limitations which Congress has prescribed." Morgan v. United States, 298
U. S. 468, 479 (1936).
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is not a distinctive designation. Every officer and agency created by Congress
to carry laws into effect is an arm of Congress in a very real sense. If we
confine the term to the independent commissions we must remember that
it is at best an artificial description of and not a reason for their independent
status. We cannot prove the commissions independent by calling them "arms
of Congress" when we mean by "arms of Congress" agencies which are
independent. The term may be a synonym; it is not an argument.
3. Power of Congress to confer on commissions the status of
independence
The most important and difficult *constitutional question concerning the
relation of Congress to the commissions is that of the nature and extent of
Congressional power to make the commissions "independent". "Indepen-
dence" here means freedom from the normal control exercised by the President
over his subordinates, not independence in the geographical sense of being
outside the ten executive departments.' 8 The power of Congress to confer
this status of independence is of the greatest practical importance, and the
theories upon which it rests are the subject of sharp controversy.
a. The power to confer independence on some agencies is well
established
In the first place, since we are dealing with present realities we may accept
the fact that Congress may constitutionally set up agencies free from the
discretionary control of the President. This was established by the unanimous
holding of the Supreme Court, in the Humphrey case,' 9 that such inde-
pendence had been given to the Federal Trade Commission. In exercising
its authority "to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into exe-
cution" its delegated powers, Congress enjoys wide discretion to determine
sThe question whether there could properly be an agency wholly independent of the
major executive departments was discussed by Secretary of State Monroe in 1812 in
connection with a proposal to take the Patent Office out of the State Department and
make it independent. He wrote to Dr. Seybert in the House of Representatives as
follows:
"I have always thought that every institution, of what nature soever it might be,
ought to be comprised within some one of the Departments of the Government,
the chief of which only should be responsible to the Chief Executive Magistrate
of the Nation. The establishment of inferior independent departments, the heads of
which are not, and ought not to be, members of the administration, appears to me
to be liable to many serious objections, which will doubtless occur to you. I will
mention the following only, first, that the concerns of such inferior departments
cannot be investigated and discussed with the same advantage in the meetings and
deliberations of the administration, as they might be if the person charged with
them was present. The second is that, to remedy this inconvenience, the President
would, necessarily, become the head of that department himself, and thus be drawn
into much investigation, in detail, that would take his attention from more general
and important concerns, to the prejudice of the public interest." Letter, June 10,
1812; 2 AmE. STATE PAPERS. Misc., p. 192.tSupra note 12.
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the structure and legal relationships of the agencies set up to do its will.
It may choose, within limits later to be discussed,20 whether it will assign'a
regulatory job to an executive officer or to a commission independent of
normal executive control. The anomalous situation of the Board of Tax
Appeals and the Bituminous Coal Commission, already mertioned,21 suggests
a somewhat befuddled legislative purpose to do both at the same time. The
first of these is declared to be "in the executive branch", and the other "in
the Department of the Interior", but the members of neither can be removed
by the President except for cause. Congress had great difficulty in deciding
whether to give the administration of the Packers and Stockyards Act to
the Federal Trade Commission or to the Secretary of Agriculture. It created
an "independent" Shipping Board in 1916; it allowed the President in 1933
to reduce that board to bureau status in the Department of Commerce and
ratified the change ;22 and then in 1936 it turned the bureau back into the
"independent" Maritime Commission.23 Congress may find it hard to decide
what to do in these matters, but once it does decide, it has full constitutional
power-subject to the limitations later discussed-to confer "independence"
or not, as it wishes.
b. Congress is not required by the Constitution to create independent
agencies
It has already been pointed out that Congress is not required to assign
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial jobs to bodies which are independent.2 4
It may do so if it wishes, but there is no situation in which it is compelled
to do so either by the doctrine of the separation of powers or by the require-
ments of due process of law. The complete repudiation of the idea that
"independence" is ever constitutionally necessary is found in the fact that
the Packers and Stockyards Act is administered by a cabinet secretary and
that that act has been held valid. It is true that the Supreme Court, especially
since the enactment of some of the New Deal legislation extending Presi-
dential authority, has made no secret of its sympathetic approval of the
independent regulatory commissioln as an instrument for the exercise of
regulatory powers.2 5 It has even been suggested that the rigid procedural
'Infra p. 169.
'See first part of this article pp. 43-44.
"By Executive Order 6166 of June 10, 1933, the Board was converted into the Ship-
ping Board Bureau. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 transferred the functions of the
Shipping Board to the newly created United States Maritime Commission and consti-
tuted a recognition and approval by Congress of the earlier abolition of the Shipping
Board and the transfer of its functions to the Department of Commerce.
'Act of June 29, 1936, 49 STAT. 1986.
"See first part of this article at p. 33 ff.
"See the language of Chief Justice Hughes regarding the Federal Trade Commission
in Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 533 (1935).
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requirements imposed on the Secretary of Agriculture in the two recent
Morgan cases 26 may ultimately drive the administration of the Packers and
Stockyards Act into the hands of an independent commission by rendering
it impracticable for a cabinet secretary to comply with those requirements
and do anything else. The fact remains that Congress need not create an
"independent" commission to do any particular job.
c. Limitations on power of Congress to make commissions
"independent"
The really important question is whether there are any constitutional
limitations on the power of Congress to make agencies independent, and, if
so, what they are. There is sharp difference of opinion on these questions
and there is certainly no clear answer to them in the decisions of the Supreme
Court.
We may first dispose of a relatively minor point. It seems clear that
Congress may constitutionally give to an officer a practical sort of inde-
pendence from Presidential control by specifying in elaborate detail the nature
and scope of his duties and the methods to be followed in performing them.
This may be pushed to the point of giving him duties which are purely min-
isterial: duties in the performance of which there is no element of discretion.
Such officers are not thereby made independent in the sense of being beyond
the reach of the President's discretionary power of removal, but the President
cannot authorize or require them to deviate from their statutory duties.
This was all worked out in a persuasive dictum by Mr. Justice Thidnpson
in the Kendall case in 1838.27 He said:
"It by no means follows from the vesting of executive power in the
President that every officer in every branch of an executive department
is under the exclusive direction of the President .... There are certain
political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department,
the discharge of which is under the direction of the President. But it
would be an alarming doctrine, that Congress cannot impose upon any
executive, officer any duty they may think proper, which is not repug-
nant to any rights secured and protected by the Constitution; and in
such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to
the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President. And
this is emphatically the case where the duty enjoined is of a mere
ministerial character. . . To contend, that the obligation imposed on
the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to
forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the Constitution, and
entirely inadmissable."
'Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936) ; Morgan v. United States, 304 U.
S. 1 (1938). For a penetrating comment on the practical implications of these cases see
Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law (1938) 47 YAT.E
L. J. 647, 662-664.
'Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Peters 524, 610-613 (U. S. 1838).
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The weight of opinion (there being no judicial decision in point) is that
the President could not validly review a quasi-judicial decision reached by
one of his subordinates in pursuance of statutory authority.28 It is very clear,
however, that while the President could not change the decision if he did
not like it, he could remove the executive officer who made it.2 9 The knowl-
edge of this fact may well have the practical effect of giving the President
his way in the first instance. The question is also pertinent whether Congress
could confer discretion in matters other than quasi-judicial, upon a subor-
dinate executive officer and make his exercise of that discretion final. Here
again there is no relevant judicial authority, but experience and opinion sup-
port the view that the officer's discretion could not be thus placed beyond
the President's reach. There can be no doubt, however, of the power of
Congress to limit the discretion of officers and thereby narrow the range of
Presidential direction. The type of "independence" which results is estab-
lished for the purpose of protecting the job rather than the officer from
Presidential control.
i. The doctrine of the Myers and Humphrey cases
From a practical point of view the only way in which Congress can make
the regulatory commissions "independent" is by limiting the discretionary
power of the President to remove their members from office. If he can
remove them at pleasure, he can control them; if he cannot remove them,
he cannot control them. The only judicial answers we have to the question
of how far Congress can go in restricting the President's removal power
are to be found in Myers v. United States ° and Humphrey's Executor v.
United States.31 The two cases were widely, elaborately and ably discussed.3 2
"'William Wirt held in 1823 that the President had no power to review a decision
on the settlement of an account by the accounting officer of the Treasury department.(1 Op. Att'y Gen. 625). Taney disagreed with this opinion when he became Attorney
General (2 Op. Att'y Gen. 463), but later reversed himself (ibid. 507). Attorneys
General Berien (2 Op. Att'y Gen. 625) and Crittenden (5 Op. Att'y Gen. 628) denied
that the President could review the accounting officer's decision, but claimed that the
Secretary of the Treasury might do so. Cushing upheld the President's power of review,
but all subsequent opinions have followed the earlier view with respect to quasi-judicial
decisions on the settlement of accounts (11 Op. Att'y Gen. 108; 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 65;
15 Op. Att'y Gen. 139), the determination of claims to public lands by the Secretary'of
the Interior (11 Op. Att'y Gen. 14; 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 31), etc." From an unpublished
memorandum by John F. Miller, of Washington, D. C.
t"Then there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers
and members of executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of
individuals, the discharge of which the President cannot in a particular case properly
influence or control. But even in such a case he may consider the decision after its
rendition as a reason for removing the officer, on the ground that the discretion regu-
larly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been on the whole intelligently or wisely
exercised." Taft, C. J., in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 135 (1926).
3272 U. S. 52 (1926).
U295 U. S. 602 (1935).
'Particularly relevant is the able article by Donovan and Irvine, The President's
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This is not the place to analyze them in detail. It will suffice to state what
they appear to have held, to appraise their effect upon the power of Congress
to set up "independent" regulatory agencies, and to draw attention to some
of the problems which they left unsolved.
In the Myers case the Supreme Court held by a six-to-three vote that
Congress could not constitutionally restrict the President's power to remove
a first-class postmaster appointed by him with the advice and consent of
the Senate. The attempted restriction was a requirement that the Senate
concur in the removal of the officer. The Court's result was supported by
two main arguments. One was historical and undertook to show that long-
standing governmental practice had recognized an illimitable removal power in
the President. The other argument rested on the theory that the President's
power of discretionary removal is an inherent part of the executive power
granted to the President by Article II of the Constitution, and is also implied
from the constitutional mandate to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed". If the removal power comes from the Constitution directly, then
it cannot be taken away or pruned down by Congress without violating the
doctrine of the separation of powers. Chief Justice Taft had been President
of the United States and from the vantage point of this administrative ex-
perience indulged in some rather sweeping dicta in the Myers opinion. He
asserted that Congress was without authority to restrict the President's
removal power, not merely in the case of postmasters and similar executive
officers, but also in the case of the various quasi-judicial commissions.38
While the point is not clearly met it seems probable that in his opinion the
only officers who could be placed by. Congress beyond the reach of the
President's discretionary removal were judicial officers-i.e., judges of terri-
torial and legislative courts.34
In Humphrey's Executor v. United States the Supreme Court unanimously
discarded Chief Justice Taft's dictum in the Myers case and held that Con-
gress could validly forbid the President to remove a member of the Federal
Trade Commission except for the causes stated in the statute. Speaking for
the Court, Mr. Justice Sutherland declares that the question whether the
President's power of removal can be limited by Congress depends "upon the
character of the office",3 5 and the rule of the Myers case is held to apply
only to "purely executive officers".,6 He recognizes that from the viewpoint
of "the character of the office" there is a lot of difference between a post-
Power to Remove Members of Administrative Agencies (1936) 21 CoRaIz.L L. Q. 215.
See also HART, TENUaR OF OFFICE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1930).
'Supra note 29.
'Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 154-158 (1926).
'1295 U. S. 602, 631 (1935).
'Id. at 632.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
master and a member of the Federal Trade Commission apd he therefore adds:
"To the extent that, between the decision in the Myers case, which
sustains the unrestrictable power of the President to remove purely
executive officers, and our present decision that such power does not
extend to an office such as that here involved, there shall remain a field
of doubt, we leave such cases as may fall within it for future considera-
tion and determination as they may arise.1
3 7
There are two -ways of approaching the Court's decision in the Humphrey
case. It is quite possible to regard the case as an invitation to debate all
,over again the issue presented by the conflicting views of Chief Justice Taft
and Mr. Justice Sutherland on the removal power. There is no inescapable
logic which leads surely to either position. Each opinion is a rationalization
of a conclusion in policy, and one may take one's choice. A powerful argu-
ment may be built up in support of the Taft view that the President's
executive responsibility and consequently his removal power extend to all
officers of the United States who are not doing work which is clearly judicial.
The Government's meager twenty-seven page brief supporting the President's
right to remove Humphrey, a brief which pretty obviously assumed that the
Court would be guided by the dictum in the Myers opinion, did not begin
to present the full argument available.38 One who agrees with the Taft posi-
tion may elaborate its rationale and argue that the regulatory commission
.cannot be protected by Congress from the discretionary removal power of
the President. This is a task well worth doing. The other approach to the
Humphrey case is more matter of fact. For better or for worse that decision
is now the law of the land. There seems small chance of converting the Court
to the view that the Constitution requires that the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the Interstate Commerce Commission be" subject to the President's
discretionary power of removal. On this assumption we may accept the
,decision as a fact and try to determine what it holds and what inferences
must be drawn from it. It is from this second approach that the present
discussion proceeds.
The narrow holding of the Humphrey case is, as we have seen, that Con-
gress could validly protect members of the Federal Trade Commission from
Presidential removal except for causes stated in the statute. The scope of
nIbid.
"'In Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S. 311, this Court held that the Customs
Administrative Act of 1890, which provided that a member of the Board of General
Appraisers could be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty or mal-
feasance in office, did not confine the President's removal power to those causes alone.
• .. In Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, this Court was apparently agreed that
-the rule of construction in the Shurtleff case is applicable to the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. A departure from this construction would raise a serious constitutional
question." Brief for the United States, p. 6, Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295
U. S. 602 (1935).
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the removal power depends upon the "character of the office". What char-
acteristics does the Federal Trade Commission have which distinguish it
from a postmastership? According to Mr. Justice Sutherland there appear
to be four. First, the Commission "occupies no place in the executive de-
partment . . . and exercises no part of the executive power vested by the
Constitution in the President". 39 Second, it acts "in part quasi-legislatively
and in part quasi-judicially" in administering the legislative standard of
"unfair methods of competition".40 Third, it is a "legislative agency" 41 in
making investigations, and reports thereon to Congress. Fourth, it acts as
"an agency of the judiciary" in its 'master in chancery" relationship to the
courts. 42 In contrast to this, a postmaster is a "purely executive" officer and
the Myers case therefore holds no more than that Congress cannot limit the
President's power to remove an officer who is "purely executive". 43
The opinion is extremely unsatisfactory. It is loosely reasoned and it
employs terms which are not clearly defined. The proposition that the Com-
mission "occupies no place in the executive department . . . and exercises
no part of the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President"
is wholly unsupported and begs the major question at issue. The opinion
does not indicate whether all four of the characteristics stated above are
necessary in order to protect the Commission from discretionary removal by
the President. Would the fact that it acts "quasi-legislatively and quasi-
judicially" be enough, or must it also be an agency of Congress and the
Courts, or either of them? When Mr. Justice Sutherland comments upon the
nature of "executive officers" and "executive power" he falls into hopeless
ambiguity. In speaking of the executive officer he says:
"A postmaster is an executive officer restricted to the performance
of executive functions. He is charged with no duty at all related to
either the legislative or judicial power. The actual decision in the
Myers case finds support in the theory that such an officer is merely
one of the units in the executive department and hence inherently sub:-
ject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal by the chief
executive, whose subordinate and aid he is."'44
This does not tell us whether the postmaster is an executive officer because
of the nature of his job or because he is one of the "units in the executive
department". Furthermore, if we assume what seems the only sound theory,
that he is an executive officer because he exercises executive power, what do
we mean by executive power? There is further confusion on this point.
-295 U. S. 602, 628 (1935).
'Ibid.
"'lbid.
12Ibid.
"3Id. at 627-628.
"Id. at 627.
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The opinion emphasizes that the Federal Trade Commission "exercises no
part of the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President".4 >
Later, in speaking of the duties of the Federal Trade Commission which
are not quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, it is said: "To the extent that it
exercises any executive function-as distinguished from executive power in
the constitutional sense-it does so''46 as an incident to its other powers.
Here is the interesting suggestion that there are two kinds of executive
power-the constitutional variety given by Article II to the President, and
"executive functions" which are something different. It seems to be inferred
that the exercise by an officer of this second variety of "executive functions"
would not be incompatible with the status of "independence", while the exer-
cise of executive power "in the constitutional sense" would be. But neither
variety of executive power is defined or explained.4 7
The Humphrey decision left one important problem unsettled, since the
issue was not involved. What is the status of the removal power in respect
to a commission which not only "acts quasi-legislatively and quasi-judicially"
but also has important executive powers? The problem in the Humphrey
case was simplified because the Federal Trade Commission has no substan-
tial executive duties which are not an integral part of its quasi-judicial work.
The Interstate Commerce Commission, however, carries on the executive
task of enforcing the Safety Appliance Acts, a task certainly not "incidental"
to the quasi-judicial job of rate-making. The Commission is obviously not
"purely executive" in the sense in which the Humphrey opinion uses the
term; but equally clearly it is not purely quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial.
This is true of most of the regulatory commissions and this means that their
constitutional status was not determined by the Humphrey case.
In view of the confusion in which the problem has been left, one cannot
predict with any assurance just where the Supreme Court will place the line
dividing agencies which may be protected from discretionary removal from
those which may not. It seems probable that the line will be a practical one,
in the drawing of which the doctrine of the separation of powers will weigh
less than considerations of policy. I venture the following conclusions as
to the present status of the commissions.
First, the President's illimitable removal power is not confined by the
Humphrey case to "purely executive" officers. To hold this would have been
pure dictum. What Mr. justice Sutherland does say is that the Myers
decision, on its facts, could not go further than to uphold the President's
5Id. at 628.
40Ibid.
'This distinction completes the picture. We now apparently have two grades of
executive power just as we have two grades of legislative power and two grades ofjudicial power. See first part of this article p. 31.
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power to remove a "purely executive" officer. He did not hold, and could
not hold, either that the power stopped there or that it went beyond. To
insist, however, that Congress can make independent all officers and agencies
which are not "purely executive" would permit the virtual destruction of
the President's effective control of the executive branch. Few officers and
agencies perform duties which are "purely executive",, and Congress can
easily deprive a "purely executive" officer of that status by giving him some
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial task. The Post Office Department is one
of the great executive departments, but it is not 'purely executive" since it
handles many important quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial jobs. Some forty
quasi-judicial tasks are carried on in the Department of Agriculture,48 while,
as we have seen, the Secretary in administering the Packers and Stockyards
Act is performing the "legislative" function of rate-making as an "agent"
of Congress. 49 The sound rule would seem to be this: If the inajor or
primary functions of an agency are executive in nature, the President retains
full power of removal, even though the agency has in addition quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial powers which, taken by themselves, would justify a status
of independence under the Humphrey rule.
Second, a fair appraisal of the Humphrey opinion points to the important
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial work which the Federal Trade Commis-
sion was set up to perform as the basic reason justifying its immunity from
executive removal. We may conclude that Congress may validly create
agencies which are thus "independent" for the purpose of doing similar quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial work. Mr. Justice Sutherland uses both the
term "quasi-legislative" and the term "quasi-judicial" to describe the Com-
mission's task of administering the legislative standard of "unfair methods
of competition". The function is more commonly called merely quasi-judicial.
Clearly Congress could have given the quasi-judicial work of administering
the Packers and Stockyards Act to the Federal Trade Commission rather
than to the Secretary of Agriculture, and it seriously debated doing it.50
The Food and Drug Administration could, without major changes, be set
up as an independent agency. It seems safe to conclude that the constitutional
justification for "independence" is the performance of quasi-judicial duties,
and that Congress, in its discretion, may set up independent agencies for
the purpose of doing such work.
Third, I do not believe that executive tasks can constitutionally be given
to "independent" agencies, unless they are clearly incidental to the quasi-
judicial functions which justify independence. While there is disagreement
'Stpra note 15.
"See first part of this article at p. 36.
"HERRING, op. cit. supra note 2 at 120: LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938)
112.
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about this,51 it seems to me to be clearly implied in the language of the
Humphrey52 opinion and to be required by the logic of the Myers decision.
Obviously, quasi-judicial functions can be and are given to executive officers.
Congress is under no compulsion to place quasi-judicial tasks in the hands
of independent agencies. But the Constitution requires that executive func-
tions be performed under direction of the President, and the Myers case
makes clear that Congress is not at liberty to withdraw them from that
direction by limiting the President's power to remove the officers who per-
form them. It follows that Congress may not properly give to the inde-
pendent commissions functions which, separately considered, could not validly
be made the exclusive job of an independent agency. Any other rule permits
the crippling of the President's executive power and loads the quasi-judicial
independent bodies with constitutional contraband.
Congress has not followed this rule. It has shown no reluctance to give
to the independent commissions any jobs which could be conveniently dumped
upon them. The Interstate Commerce Commission has the executive task
of enforcing the Safety Appliance Acts. No one claims that this work is
quasi-judicial or that a separate independent body could be set up for its
exclusive administration.53 The fact that the Commission does this work
well is, of course, irrelevant to the issue. The Maritime Commission has
limited quasi-judicial duties in respect to rates and service. This task, how-
ever, is overshadowed by its important managerial and executive duties in
respect to construction and operating subsidies and the leasing of government-
owned vessels.5 4
In my opinion the giving of these executive duties to these two commis-
sions, each of which lies out of reach of the President's discretionary removal,
is unconstitutional and should be so held. A decision to this effect would
revive the President's removal power and abolish the "independence" of
the two bodies. Congress could meet this situation by relieving the commis-
sions of work which is not quasi-judicial or reasonably incidental to quasi-
judicial work. The executive jobs could be given to executive officers and
sound administration would be furthered thereby. If Congress did not wish
'The opposite view is taken by Donovan and Irvine, loc. cit. supra note 32 at 243 ff.
'Mr. Justice Sutherland, as already mentioned, takes pains to indicate that such
executive functions as the Federal Trade Commission possesses are "incidental to 'its
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial" duties. 295 U. S. 602, 628 (1935).
'"In addition it [the Interstate Commerce Commission] has a few duties which may
be classed with executive or judicial functions of government." Eastman, supra note 11,
at 182.
'The incidental nature of the regulatory duties of the Commission is indicated by
the following provision: " . . . After the expiration of two years from the effective date
of this Act, the President is authorized to transfer, by Executive order, to the Interstate
Commerce Commission any or all regulatory powers, regulatory duties, and regulatory
functions which, by this title, are vested in the United States Maritime Commission."
Act of June 29, 1936, 49 STAT. 1985, Title II, § 204 (c).
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to do this it might consider and experiment with the device embodied in some
of the earlier drafts, but not the final provisions, of the Civil Aeronautics
Bill passed in 1938."5 The proposed Civil Aeronautics Authority was to
have important executive as well as quasi-judicial powers. It was therefore
provided:
"The exercise and performance of the powers and duties of the
Authority which are not subject to review by courts of law shall be
subject to the general direction of the President." 56
The bill did not restrict the President's power of removal, but had it done
so in the usual way it is clear that the Authority's failure or refusal to
follow the President's direction as required by the statute would constitute
either neglect of duty or misconduct and therefore cause for removal.57
ii. Can Congress make a commission completely independent by taking away
the President's power to remove for causer
Congress has never created a completely "independent" regulatory com-
mission.58 The independence given has consisted in immunity from the
President's discretionary removal power. Always the President has been
left with power to remove the members of these "independent" bodies for
various causes stated in the statute. Is it constitutionally necessary to leave
the President this power? Could Congress validly give to the Interstate
Commerce Commission the status which the Budget and Accounting Act
gives to the Comptroller General and the Assistant Comptroller General?
This is described as follows:
"The Comptroller General and Assistant Comptroller General may
be removed at any time by joint resolution of Congress, after notice
and hearing when, in the judgment of Congress, the Comptroller Gen-
eral or Assistant Comptroller General has become permanently in-
capacitated or has been inefficient, or guilty of neglect of duty, or of
malfeasance in office, or of any felony or conduct involving moral turp-
itude, and for no other cause and in no other manner except by
impeachment."' 59
OAct of June 23, 1938; 52 STAT. 973; 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 401 et seq. (Supp. 1938).
'4See tentative draft of a bill, dated January 29, 1938, under consideration by the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
ulThe view expressed here would support the power of the President to remove the
Chairman of the T. V. A. Board. In my opinion Congress could not constitutionally
place the members of an agency performing the executive and managerial functions of
the T. V. A. beyond the reach of discretionary removal. It is possible that the Court
will not have to pass on this constitutional issue since the T. V. A. statute does not
indicate a clear intention to restrict the President's removal power. See note (1938) 51
HARV. L. REv. 1246.
r'"Strictly speaking there is, of course, no such thing as an independent commission,
for I have already shown that the Congress, the President, and the courts all have some
measure of control over their functioning." Eastman, The Place of the Independent
Colinmission in the Federal Government (1928) 12 CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 97.
w31 U. S. C. A. §§ 41, 43 (1927). On June 4, 1920, President Wilson vetoed the
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There is no judicial answer to this question. While judges on the legislative
courts have tenure during good behavior and can be removed only by im-
peachment, they are judicial officers and present therefore a wholly different
problem. °0 It can plausibly be argued that the President cannot be deprived
of the power to remove for cause any officer not engaged in legislative or
judicial work, since to do so would prevent him from taking "care that the
laws be faithfully executed". Strong reasons of policy have led Congress to
allow the President to remove members of the independent commissions for
cause. The only alternatives are to legislate them out of office or to impeach
them. Both methods are cumbersome and neither provides an effective way
of enforcing even minimum standards of efficiency and honesty. The opinion
in the Humphrey case is careful to speak of the independence of the Federal
Trade Commission in terms of freedom from the President's discretionary
removal power and assumes throughout that the power to remove for cause
is a n&essary and appropriate Presidential power. We shall consider this
question further at a later point.61
B. THE PRESIDENT AND THE COMMISSIONS
The relations of the President to the independent regulatory commissions
grow out of his power to appoint and to remove their members. These two
powers will now be considered.
1. The President's power to appoint commissioners
The President has power to appoint members of the regulatory commis-
sions. Such members are "officers of the United States" within the meaning
of the clause of Article II which gives the President power with the advice
and consent of the Senate to appoint ambassadors, judges, etc., "and all other
officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise
Budget and Accounting Bill because he believed these removal provisions were uncon-
stitutional. He said:
"The section referred to not only forbids the Executive to remove these officers
but undertakes to empower the Congress by a concurrent resolution to remove dn
officer appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. I can
find in the Constitution no warrant for the exercise of this power by the Congress.
There is certainly no express authority conferred and I am unable to see that
authority for the exercise of this power is implied in any express grant of power.
On the contrary, I think its exercise is clearly negatived by section 2 of Article II.
That section . ..provides that the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of
law, or in the heads of departments. . . .Regarding as I do the power of removal
from office as an essential incident to the appointing power, I can not escape the
conclusion that the vesting of this power of removal in the Congress is unconsti-
tutional and therefore I am unable to approve the bill. . . . " H. R. Doc. No. 805,
66th Cong. 2d Sess. (1920).
'This is true of the Court of Claims, the Customs Court, and the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals.
'Inira p. 181 ff.
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provided for, and which shall be established". Congress may give to the
President alone, to the heads of departments, or to the courts of law, the
power to appoint "such inferior officers as they think proper". 62 Conceivably,
then, an independent commission could be appointed by a cabinet secretary,
but this would be a curiously anomalous arrangement which would accomplish
nothing in the way of freedom from Presidential influence in the selection
should the President care to exert that influence. 63 But Congress itself can-
not constitutionally appoint "an officer of the United States". The Supreme
Court so held in United States v. Ferreira in 1852.64
Granting that Congress may not appoint officers, may it validly specify
by statute qualifications which they must have, or disqualifications which
they may not have? In a letter to the Senate in 1822, President Monroe
strongly contended that:
"In filling original vacancies-that is, offices newly created-it is my
opinion, as a general principle, that Congress has no right under the
Constitution to impose any restraint by law on the power granted to
the President so as to prevent his making a free selection of proper
persons for these offices from the whole body of his fellow-citizens." 65
Whatever plausibility this theory may have had, it has long since passed into
the discard. -It seems well established that Congress may specify qualifications
and disqualifications for office so long as it does not violate the provision
of Article VI that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification
to any office or public trust under the United States."
Congress has not exercised this power with any uniformity. In the case
of thousands of offices Congress has set up no qualifications. There is, for
instance, no law requiring the Attorney General, any federal judge, or even
the justices of the Supreme Court to be learned in the liw. In creating the
regulatory commissions, however, Congress has set up both qualifications and
disqualifications which the President must reckon with in appointing their
"'U. S. CoNsT. Art. II § 2.
"Since the President may remove the Secretary if he makes an appointment objection-
able to the President.
"13 Howard 40, 51 (U. S. 1852).
r*There was disagreement on this in Monroe's Cabinet. See the following statement
by John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State:
"Received a notice from the President for a cabinet meeting at his house at 11
o'clock. President [Monroe] has concluded to send his message [see Monroe note
quoted in text] only to Senate. He (Monroe] proposed to nominate again Colonel
Towson and Colonel Gadsden after they had been rejected by the Senate ...
"Crawford makes it a constitutional question whether Congress can limit the
selection of persons to whom the President's right of nomination shall be confined
for appointment to office; for instance, whether a law could confine the nomination
of a judge or Attorney-General to persons learned in the law; commissioners of
the navy to captains in the naval service, and the like. The President entertains
the same opinion, and has exprssed it in the message. iMr. Thompson, the Secre-
tary of the Navy maintained the contrary to which I also inclined." Entry in diary
dated April 12, 1822, MEMOIRs OF 5. Q. ADAMS, Vol. II, 488.
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members.66 A common requirement is that not more than a bare majority
be members of the same political party.6 7 Other requirements are those of
citizenship, 68 residence in a geographical area, 69 technical or expert fitness,70
etc. Persons having a financial interest in the business or industry to be
regulated are usually barred from membership in the regulating commission. 71
In one case an officer who has served one term is made ineligible to another.72
It seems clear that Congress may validly set up these qualifications and
disqualifications. Those which are definite in form, such as the disqualification
for financial interest, or the requirement of citizenship, could probably be
enforced in the courts, although there is no judicial authority on this point.7
Some of the others, such as the requirement that a commissioner be appointed
because of special fitness for the job, are to be regarded as pious admonitions
rather than enforceable requirements. In all these cases, however, the will
of Congress may be effectuated by the political check of senatorial confirma-
tion. The Senate is very unlikely to connive with the President in appointing
a commissioner who does not meet the definite requirements, or suffers from
the disabilities, set out in the statutes.
These statutory qualifications, however, still leave the President the widest
sort of latitude in making his appointments. It is hard to overestimate the
far-reaching importance of the President's power and responsibility in this
matter. Every President is sure to have the opportunity to appoint several
members of each of the commissions, and a President in eight years can, if
he wishes, virtually reorganize any one of them through the routine appoint-
ment of new members. 74 President Coolidge attempted to employ the rather
dubious practice of using the power to appoint a commissioner, or to with-
hold such appointment, as currency with which to purchase a discretionary
removal power denied by statute. This was done by demanding as the price
of an appointment to the Federal Tariff Commission an undated letter of
'These are set out in a chart in CUSHMAN, THE PROBLEM OF THE INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1936) 35. For a more elaborate tabulation of statutory
qualifications of office-holders, see dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52, 264 ff. (1926).
'The only exception is the Federal Reserve Board.
'Required of Federal Communications Commission.
'Under the Radio Act of 1927, the country was divided into five zones in each of
which one member of the Radio Commission must be a resident.
"This is required in the case of the United States Maritime Commission.
'There is no analogous restriction with respect to members of the National Labor
Relations Board. In the case of the Federal Trade Commission it is provided that "no
commissioner shall engage in any other business, vocation, or employment." 15 U. S.
C. A. § 41 (1927).
'The Federal Reserve Act makes a member of the Federal Reserve Board who serves
a full fourteen year term ineligible to reappointment.7 It seems to be implied, however, in United States v. Le Baron, 19 Howard 73, 78
(U. S. 1856).
"'Statistical evidence of this appears in HERRING, FEDERAL COMMISSIONERS (1936)
Appendix P., p. 144-5.
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resignation which the President was free to use at any time without public
explanation if he wished to do so. The request was refused and the appoint-
ment was withheld.75 Whatever the general propriety of such a course may
be, there is no constitutional objection to it.
2. The President's power to remove commissioners
We have touched upon some aspects of the President's power to remove
members of independent regulatory commissions in discussing the power of
Congress to limit it ;76 but there are other aspects of the President's removal
power which merit attention.
In the first place, it has been settled for many years that the President
has discretionary power to remove officers whom he appoints if there is no
Congressional restriction upon that power. This was established in Ex parte
Hennen in 1839.7 7 The President's power to remove is implied from his
power to appoint as well as from the grant of executive power in Article II,
and therefore reaches, in the absence of statutory restriction, even officers
not "purely executive" within the rule of the Myers case. Therefore, if Con-
gress wishes to protect a regulatory commission from the President's dis-
cretionary removal power, it must do so by positive legislation. In the case
of several commissions-the Federal Power Commission, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission-there is
no limitation on the removal power and the President could, accordingly,
dismiss any or all members of these commissions at his pleasure.
The President is authorized to appoint the chairmen of some of the com-
missions. 78 In no case is there statutory limitation on his power to remove
the chairman from his chairmanship, although in some cases he can remove
him from his commissionership only for cause. The President may thus make
changes in the chairmanship at his discretion. This power is important from
the viewpoint of practical administration. 79
In the second place, it is my belief that the power to remove for causes
specified by statute is a much more powerful implement in the hands of
the President than is commonly realized. In the acts creating the regulatory
commissions, the causes for which the President may remove members, where
any are specified, are inefficiency, neglect of duty, incompetence, misconduct,
'D. J. Lewis bad been appointed to the Tariff Commission by President Wilson. The
undated resignation was requested as a condition to his reappointment in 1925. See
HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1936) 96.
"'Supra, p. 170 ff.
113 Pet. 230 (U. S. 1839).
"This is true of the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Communications Commission,
National Labor Relations Board, and United States Maritime Commission.
"For illuminating comment on the practical importance of permanent chairmen for
the commissions see LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 50 at 117. If appointed by the President
the chairman may become a liaison officer between the President and the commission.
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or malfeasance in office. The acts differ in this respect, for no logical reason. 80
The Federal Reserve Act authorizes the President to remove members of
the Federal Reserve Board "for cause" without defining what "cause" is.
President Wilson, under whose close scrutiny the Federal Reserve Act was
drafted, assumed that the right to remove "for cause" authorized him to re-
move the members of the Board if they carried out a certain policy which he
believed to be a usurpation of power. He was fully prepared to "reorganize"
the Board had it not withdrawn from the positibn taken. 81
The fairly typical provision that members of the Interstate Commerce
Commission may be removed by the President for "inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office" gives him, I believe, the following kinds of
authority over the Commission. First, under penalty of removal, he may
exact reasonable efficiency and absolute integrity. He can, in short, "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed" by the Commission. His authority
should extend to collective as well as individual inefficiency. Incompetent
administrative management, 'negligence or tardiness in the performance of
duties; susceptibility to improper pressure, laxness in the enforcement of
punitive statutes, usurpation of authority, dishonesty, or official misconduct
would, any one of them, justify the removal of a single commissioner or
any number of commissioners to whom responsibility for such derelictions
could be brought home. In short, if it becomes apparent that the Commission
is not doing its job competently and honestly, the President has full power
to "clean house", to "reorganize" the Commission under the authority of
the removal clause quoted above.
Second, I believe that the President, under the power to remove for cause,
can force an independent regulatory commission to comply with executive
orders of general application unless Congress clearly indicates that such
orders should not apply. These executive orders are numerous and relate
to a multitude of matters, many of them trivial, which affect the general
efficiency, of the government. Some of them deal with matters in respect
to which uniformity throughout the entire service is highly desirable, such
as personnel administration, holidays, sick-leave, etc. Others relate to co-
operative and coordinating activities designed to effect harmonious adjust-
ments of joint or overlapping responsibilities. To put an extreme case, if
Congress established an independent commission with no statutory direction
as to the recruiting and tenure of its staff of employees, the President might
by executive order under authority of the Civil Service Act extend the pro-
visions of that Act to the commission's staff. If Congress did not wish such
'These are tabulated in the chart referred to in note 66, supra.81GLAsS, AN ADVENTURE IN CONSTRUcTIVE FINANCE (1927) 270-2. The Board was
planning to abolish several of the regional reserve banks created by the statute. The
President and Mr. Glass regarded such action as ultra vires.
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executive orders to be extended to the commission it could, of course, exempt
it by statute. Otherwise, the refusal of the commission to obey the President's
executive order would constitute neglect of duty or misconduct which would
justify the removal of the commissioners from office.82
Finally, .n independent commission may be required by law to perform
certain duties at the direction of the President. This is not very common.
The Federal Trade Commission, Act, however, declares it to be the duty
of the Commission, "Upon the direction of the President or either house of
Congress to investigate and report the facts relating to any alleged violations
of the anti-trust acts by any corporation.18 3 It will hardly be questioned that
a refusal by the Commission to undertake an investigation at the direction
of the President would justify their removal from office for "neglect of duty".
It is highly desirable that Congress give serious attention to the exact
statement of the causes for which members of the independent commissions
may be removed by the President. This Congress has never done. In the
legislative history of the commissions there is no record of any serious con-
sideration of this point. There is no principle upon which one can distinguish
the commissions from which members can be removed only for cause from
those from which members may be removed in the President's discretion.
The original Federal Reserve Act contained a clause authorizing removal
of Board members for "cause". In the Banking Act of 193384 this was
inadvertently omitted. The omission was discovered during the debates on
the Act of 193585 and the clause was restored. Both the Senate and House
bills for the creation of the Federal Communications Commission restricted
the President's removal power. These restrictions were, without explanation,
dropped out by the conference committee, and never restored. 6 Congress,
in short, has not regarded the matter as important. It might, however, be
made important. By a more careful and precise statement of causes for
removal, Congress could define more sharply the President's authority, could
with complete safety extend that authority into areas where it may at present
be in doubt, and in this way could ensure a higher degree of administrative
efficiency upon the part of the commissions without jeopardizing their inde-
pendence in the performance of their quasi-judicial work.
'It will be found that in the main the independent regulatory commissions comply
with executive orders applicable to them. There is no case in which non-compliance
has become an issue upon which the President has been willing to take action.
'Act of Sept. 26, 1914, 38 STAT. 717, § 6 (d).
"
1Act of June 16, 1933, 48 STAT. 31.
'Act of Aug. 23, 1935, 49 STAT. 684. Senator Glass later remarked: "I must have
been asleep when that was eliminated from the act." Hearings before Subcommittee of
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 1715 ajtd H. R. 7617, 74th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1935) 398.
'The writer asked a member of the commission why the clause had been omitted. The
commissioner was unaware that it had been.
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Finally, under what procedural limitations, if any, does the President
exercise his removal power? It is obvious that there are no such restrictions
on discretionary removal; and this includes removal of members of those
commissions in respect to which the removal power is not limited by statute.
The President need not have any reasons for such removal; if he has reasons
they need not be good ones; and he need not give the officer any opportunity
to be heard or to answer charges. Neither 'explanation nor courtesy is re-
quired. When President John Adams removed his Secretary of State,
Timothy Pickering, in 1800, he accomplished the job in a four-line note:
"Sir: Divers causes and considerations essential to the administration of the
government, in my judgment requiring a change in the department of state,
you are hereby discharged from any further service as Secretary of State.
John Adams. ' 'sT
In several cases Congress has not only stated the causes for which a com-
missioner may be removed, but has also required notice and hearing. Thus,
a member of the -National Labor Relations Board "may be removed by the
President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in
office, but for no other cause".88 It is clear that if Congress can constitu-
tionally limit removal to stated causes it can prescribe a reasonable minimum
procedure to insure the observance of the limitation. It is unnecessary, how-
ever, for Congress expressly to require notice and hearing in these cases.
The Supreme Court has indicated that notice and hearing are necessary in
such cases even when not required by statute. This has also been the uniform
holding of the state courts.8 9 This requirement appears to be grounded in
due process of law. In Shurtleff v. United States9" the Court held that the
President's removal of Shurtleff without giving him notice and hearing proved
that the removal was not made for any of the causes of removal stated in
the statute, since had the removal been for those causes notice and hearing
would have been essential. The doctrine seems eminently sound. If the
President removes an officer upon a charge of dishonesty, the officer seems
clearly to be denied due process of law if he is not notified of the charge and
given an opportunity to defend his character against it. Legitimate executive
discretion is not impaired by compelling the President to follow this fair
and reasonable procedure.
A point which remains in doubt is whether the President's removal of
13 PICKERING and UPHAM, LIFE OF TIMOTHY PICKERING (1875) 488.
8329 U. S. C. A. § 153 (a) (Supp. 1938).
'See GoODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1905) 313 and cases cited.
°189 U. S. 311 (1903). "Under the provision that the officer might be removed from
office at any time for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, we are-of
opinion that if the removal is sought to be made for those causes, or either of them, the
officer is entitled to notice and hearing." Id. at 314.
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an officer for cause after notice and hearing is reviewable by the courts.
Must the Supreme Court as well as the President be convinced that the
charges against the officer have been substantiated? There are no cases on
this point. While the state cases are in conflict, the weight of authority is
against judicial review of a governor's action in similar cases. 9' In my
opinion there should be no judicial scrutiny of a Presidential removal for
cause after notice and hearing. In removals for the causes stated in the
statutes, a large element of discretion must remain in the President. What
constitutes "inefficiency" or "misconduct" is a question of judgment, not a
question of law. Should the President, after notice and hearing, remove a
member of the Interstate Commerce Commission for cause, I believe the
Supreme Court would refuse, on grounds of the separation of powers, to
review this exercise of executive judgment. Due process of law does not
entitle the dismissed official to such judicial review. He is not-being deprived
of property because he has no property right to his office. The only right
at stake is his right to be informed of and to answer charges, and this is
protected by notice and hearing. If a President abused this removal power,
the injured officer would have no legal redress. This is only one of many
situations in which the only checks upon the abuse of Presidential power are
"political" in nature.
C. THE COMMISSIONS AND THE COURTS
1. The commissions as agents of the courts
In the Humphrey case, Mr. Justice Sutherland referred to the Federal
Trade Commission as "an agency of the judiciary".9 2 He had in mind the"
section of the Federal Trade Commission Act which provides that, in suits
brought under the anti-trust acts, the courts may refer to the Federal Trade
Commission as a master in chancery the working out, under procedure
designated by the court, of appropriate decrees of dissolution or otherwise.93
"tWhen an officer is removed for cause after notice and hearing, the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the charge will not be reviewed by the courts. Decker v. Bd. of
Health Comm'rs of Los Angeles, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 334 (1935),; State ex rel. Williams
v. Kennelly, 75 Conn. 704 (1903); State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119(1934); Harrington v. Smith, 114 Kans. 262 (1923); In re Guden, 171 N. Y. 529
(1902) ; In re Rice, 131 Misc. 220, 226 N. Y. Supp. 585 (Sup. Ct. 1928) ; Contra: State
ex rel. Hatton v. Jonghlin, 103 Fla. 877 (1932) ; State v. Purchase, 57 N. D. 511 (1929).
'295 U. S. 602, 628 (1935).
'Section 7 reads: "That in any suit in equity brought by or under the direction of
the Attorney General as provided in the anti-trust Acts, the court may, upon the con-
clusion of the testimony there, if it shall be then of opinion that the complainant is
entitled to relief, refer said suit to the commission, as a master in chancery, to ascertain
and report an appropriate form of decree therein. The commission shall proceed upon
such notice to the parties and under such rules of procedure as the court may prescribe,
and upon the coming in of such report such exceptions may be filed and such proceedings
had in relation thereto as upon the report of a matter in other equity causes, but the
court may adopt or reject such report, in whole or in part, and enter such decree as
the nature of the case may in its judgment require."
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This provision loomed large in the legislative debates on the Federal Trade
Commission bill. It was generally believed that this "master in chancery"
function would be one of the most important responsibilities of the proposed
commission. It was, in fact, a major argument for creating a commission.
It was widely felt that the task of "dissolving" the Standard Oil Company
and the American Tobacco Company after the government had won its
important suits against them in 1911 had been badly bungled. The courts
were nQt competent to deal with these complex tasks and therefore the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, an independent and permanent body of "experts",
should be called in to aid the courts in the highly technical work of formu-
lating decrees of dissolution.
Perhaps the Commission could have rendered important and valuable
service to the courts under this section, but it has not been allowed to try.
In one anti-trust suit, the court ordered a plan of dissolution to be prepared
by the respondent and filed with the Federal Trade Commission, which,
acting as a master in chancery, was to submit a plan of dissolution to the
court. Intervening litigation prevented the Commission from doing this, and
the final decree was formulated by another method.94 In two other instances
matters were referred to the Commission for investigation and report, one
by a circuit court of appeals95 and one under an agreement between the
Attorney-General and certain paper manufacturers. 96 These are the only
cases in which the Federal Trade Commission has acted as "master in
chancery". 97 No other commission has been given analogous duties. No
constitutional problems appear to be involved.
2. Judicial review of comnissions
We turn now to the important problem of the judicial review of the work
of the independent regulatory commissions. To what extent is such review
constitutionally required? By what methods is it exercised? What is its
scope? The briefest summary of these problems will serve our purpose, since
there is voluminous literature in this field,98 and also because judicial review
'United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S. D. N. Y. 1916). For
comment on the Commission's activity and the final disposition of the case see Statutes and
Decisions pertaining to the Federal Trade Commission, 1914-1929 (1930) 791.
'Federal Trade Commission v. Balme (C. C. A. 2d). See Statutes and Decisions per-
taining to the Federal Trrde Commission, 676.
'Under this agreement the Commission was made an arbitrator to decide on a fair
selling price for newsprint paper sold by the ten manufacturers in question. See Annual
Report of the Federal Trade Commission for the year ending June 30, 1918, pp. 4-5, 18.
'I am indebted to Dr. Francis Walker, Chief Economist of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, for the information on this point.
9'McFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE INTER-
STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1933); 4 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
Chapter 4, Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions (1938) ; LANDIS, Op. Cit. supra
note 50 at Chapter IV, Administrative Policies and the Courts. And see note in this
issue at p. 235.
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of the work of these commissions does not differ from review of the work
of other administrative officers doing similar jobs.
a. Constitutional necessity for judicial review
Judicial review of the independent regulatory commissions is constitu-
tionally necessary because they are "regulatory". They impinge upon private
conduct and the use of private property. In this respect they differ from
the numerous agencies which are not regulatory but which lend or give away
public money, or dispense government privileges. An individual cannot
demand on constitutional grounds a judicial scrutiny of the work of an
agency which gives him or denies him something to which he has no right
at all. But when the government through an independent commission or
otherwise licenses a business, fixes rates or charges, polices business conduct
in the interests of fair competition, or forbids "unfair labor practices", the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees basic fairness in
substance and procedure. It requires further that there be an opportunity
to present these questions of fairness to the courts for review. This is some-
times spoken of as "the rule of law", the time-honored principle that a man
is entitled to have his legal rights determined by a court. He is entitled, to
use another venerable phrase, to his "day in court" in which he may question
any official conduct which he thinks impairs his legal rights. The rule of
law (now assimilated to due process of law) does not require that the
citizen's legal rights shall be dealt with only in the courts. Nor does it
require that a court must do over again the work of the regulatory commission
which fixes a rate or enjoins an unfair business practice. It does require that
the courts at some point have the opportunity to determine whether the
rights of parties have been fairly decided by agencies which have not ex-
ceeded their legal powers.9 9 In the Minnesota Rate Cases °0  in 1890, the
Supreme Court held that the question whether a rate established by a rail-
road commission was reasonable was a judicial question upon which due
process of law required an opportunity for a judicial hearing. The courts
have adhered to this doctrine, and have applied it to the quasi-judicial work
of all of the federal regulatory commissions.
b. Methods of judicial review
Professor Stason has conveniently classified the methods of judicial review
""The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have some court
decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and whether the proceeding in
which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly." Brandeis, J., concurring in St.
Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 84 (1936). On this whole problem
see DIcKINsoN, ADmiNISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1927) passin.
'Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1890).
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
of regulatory administrative action into three categories." 1 First, there is
review provided for by statute. Second, review may be exercised by the
common law procedures of certiorari, mnandazus, and prohibition. Third, it
may come about through collateral attack in actions for damages' against
officers or suits for injunctions to restrain unlawful official conduct. This
analysis is general, and comprehends both state and federal judicial review.
These problems of procedure need not detain us. In the case of the federal
commissions, procedure for judicial review is provided by statute.102 Where
a commission has power to issue an order and put it into effect, there is
always a statutory formula under which appeal lies to the courts for review.
In the case of a cease and desist order issued by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the Commission must itself resort to the courts to enforce the order
against a non-complying party.108 Before enforcing the order the court will
satisfy itself that it has not been issued in excess of the Commission's power.
These statutory arrangements for judicial review are not exclusive, but it
is not relevant to the purpose of this study to list all of the procedural
methods of reviewing the independent commissions, or to indicate the cir-
cumstances under which one rather than another is used.
c. Scope of judicial review
Assuming that some judicial review of the work of the regulatory com-
missions is required, what is the scope of that review? Does any part of
the work of a commission lie beyond the scrutiny of the courts? Can a
commission decide any matters with finality? These are important problems
both in constitutional law and in public administration. We may group our
analysis of- them into two divisions and deal first with the judicial review of
commission findings or decisions; and second, with the judicial review of
commission methods and procedure. The conclusions here suggested are
merely rough summaries of judicial experience in a field in which the courts
have developed their position by trial and error.
i. Judicial review of connission findings or conclusions
In the first place, the commissions make certain important decisions in
the field of policy. These involve the exercise of administrative discretion,
and the courts will not review them on their merits. In fact, the constitu-
tional courts cannot review the exercise of administrative discretion, since
to do so involves the exercise of non-judicial power in violation of the doc-
trine of the separation of powers. When the Radio Commission was created,
101STAsoN, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ox ADmiSTRATIvE TI UNALS (1937)
Ch. IX.10Blachly, op. cit. supra note 15, passim.
"'Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
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it was authorized inter alia to grant broadcasting station licenses and to renew
them "where public convenience, interest or necessity will be served thereby".
An applicant for a license or a renewal thereof could appeal to the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia if the Commission ruled against him.
This court was authorized to take additional evidence if it deemed it proper
to do so and to "hear, review and determine the appeal upon said record and
evidence, and [to] alter or revise the decision appealed from and enter such
judgment as it may deem just".10 4 In Federal Radio Commission v. General
Electric Company' 5 the Supreme Court refused to review a decision of the
Court of Appeals of the District deciding an appeal from the Radio Com-
mission. The function of the Commission in granting or renewing licenses
was a "purely administrative function" and "the provision for appeals to the
Court of Appeals does no more than make that court a superior or revising
agency in the same field." The Court of Appeals of the District is a "legis-
lative court" to the extent that non-judicial duties may validly be imposed
upon it;106 but its non-judicial duties cannot be reviewed by the Supreme
Court. Congress had therefore to limit the appeal from Commission orders
to questions of law in order to make possible their ultimate review in the
Supreme Court.10 7 It may be added that Congress may in its discretion
provide for a review of commission findings of policy either by an appellate
administrative body or by a "legislative court". Administrative review is
not to be confused, however, with judicial review.
In the second place, conclusions of law made by a commission must be
open to review by the courts. No administrative agency can decide finally
a question of law. Any statutory attempt to permit this would deny due
process of law. Of course, a commission must in the first instance interpret
the statute under which it works; but that interpretation is always subject
to judicial review. The questions of law on which the independent regulatory
commissions rule are sometimes constitutional, sometimes statutory, sometimes
a mixture of both. A notable case in which the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission made a vitally important decision on a question of law, both con-
stitutional and statutory, was the well known Shreveport case. 0 8 Acting
under a statutory mandate to eliminate rate discriminations against inter-
state commerce, the Commission ordered a Texas railroad to cease charging
'Act of February 23, 1927, 44 STAT. 1162.
1w281 U. S. 464 (1930).
'O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933). It is, however, in other respects
a constitutional court.
'By Act of July 1, 1930, 46 STAT. 844, Congress limited the review by the court of
appeals to "questions of law" and provided that findings of fact if supported by sub--
stantial evidence should be conclusive. In Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros.
Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266 (1933), the Supreme Court held that the reviewing
of'commission action by the court of appeals had thereby been made judicial in nature.
"°Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. v. United States. 234 U. S. 342 (1914).
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certain freight rates fixed by state authority and applicable to purely intra-
state traffic. This was because these rates were so low that they resulted
in serious discrimination against competing interstate traffic carried at higher
rates deemed reasonable by the Commission. In issuing this order the Com-
mission had to conclude first that the statutes permitted it, and secondly that
it did not exceed the constitutional power of Congress over interstate com-
merce by interfering with commerce which was admittedly intrastate. Clearly
these important questions of law could not be finally decided by the Com-
mission. They were appealed first to the Commerce Court and thence to
the Supreme Court. Both tribunals sustained the 'Commission. To allow
a commission to determine questions of law with finality would permit it
to determine its own jurisdiction and power and to impinge upon the legal
rights of individuals without allowing them recourse to the courts in accord-
ance with the "rule of law".
It is not always easy to draw the line between a question of law and a
question of policy to be settled by administrative discretion. In close cases
the courts have usually regarded the questions involved as questions of law.
The Federal Trade Commission Act authorized the Commission to discover
and to suppress by cease and desist orders "unfair methods of competition
in commerce". The members of Congress in general thought they were giving
the Commission power to develop an administrative law in this field by
defining in the light of their expert knowledge and experience just what
concrete acts constituted "unfair methods of competition". 10 9 Some held a
narrower view of the power given. The Commission itself assumed that it
had discretionary power to define unfair methods of competition and that in
doing so it was acting for Congress which had originally contemplated defining
a long list of such practices in the statute. The Supreme Court, however, in
the Gratz case " in 1920, put an end to this interpretation by announcing
that "the words, 'unfair method of competition', are not defined by the
statute.... It is for the courts, not the Commission, ultimately to determine
as a matter of law what they include." Thus was a question of policy con-
verted into a question of law.
In the third place, the independent regulatory commissions must make al-
most countless findings of "fact". These findings of fact are necessary in
order that the Commission may know when and how to exercise its regulatory
"'Indeed, the debates themselves suggest, what seems obvious from the text of the
Act, that it was the Congressional intention to confer on the Commission, subject to
Court review, the duty of giving a detailed content to the general principle embodied in
the phrase [unfair competition], and to employ, in fulfilling this duty, not only the rules
and precedents established by the courts at common law and under previous statutes,
but the technique of reasoning by analogy and upon principle, with which jurists are
familiar." HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE ComlmIssioN (1925) 36.
'"Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920).
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powers. One of the most cogent reasons for setting up a commission is to
provide an expert body of officers to "find facts" in fields so extensive and
so technical as to be beyond the capacity of Congress or the courts. The
magnitude and the complexity of the fact-finding responsibilities of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission are the chief justification for its staff of some
two thousand persons; similar tasks occupy nearly a thousand officers and
employees of the Securities and Exchange Commission. These tasks could
be assigned to the courts only at the risk of judicial paralysis. One of the
most difficult problems in the field of administrative law is that of determining
the extent to which administrative findings of fact may be made final-i.e.,
the extent to which due process of law requires judicial review of such
findings. The difficulties here are increased by the fact that the line between
a question of law and a question of fact is often uncertain,"' and that in
their legal significance not all "facts" found by regulatory commissions are
of the same variety.
There is, to begin with, what is sometimes called a "constitutional fact".
This is a fact which must be determined in order to decide a constitutional
issue. The simplest example is the "fact" of the value of railroad property
upon which reasonable railroad rates must be based. To meet the test of due
process of law a railroad rate must not be confiscatory. It is confiscatory if
it does not permit the carrier to earn a "fair return" upon a "fair valuation"
of the property used for the purposes of transportation.'" What constitutes
"fair return" is a question of law upon which the courts must have the last
word. What is the "fair valuation" of the property of a railroad is a question
of fact. But it is a fact the correct determination of which is essential to the
protection of the respective rights of the carrier and the public. If the valua-
tion is placed at too low a figure confiscation will result from the rate fixed
on such a base. Accordingly, the courts have iheld that there must be judicial
- review of administrative findings of "constitutional facts". 31 3 To allow the
u"'In truth the distinction between 'questions of law' and 'questions of fact' really
gives little help in determining how far the courts will review; and for the good reason
that there is no fixed distinction. They are not two mutually exclusive kinds of questions,
based upon a difference of subject matter. Matters of law grow downward into roots
of fact, and matters of fact reach upward, without a break into matters of law ... It
would seem that when the courts are unwilling to review, they are tempted to explain by
the easy device of calling the question one of 'fact', and when otherwise disposed, they
say that it is a question of 'law'." DICKINSON, op. ct. supra note 99, at 55.
"Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
""Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920). In Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210, 228 (1908), Mr. Justice Holmes said: "But the
determination of their [the railroads'] rights turns almost wholly upon facts to be found.
Whether their property was taken unconstitutionally depends upon the valuation of the
property, the income to be derived from the proposed rate and the proportion between
the two-pure matters of fact. When those are settled the law is tolerably plain. All
their constitutional rights, we repeat, depend upon what the facts are found to be. They
[the railroads] are not to be forbidden to try those facts before a court of their own
choosing if otherwise competent."
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Interstate Commerce Commission to value railroad property with finality
would deny due process of law.
Then there is the category of "jurisdictional facts". These are facts upon
the existence of which rests the commission's jurisdiction to act. The juris-
dictional fact is illustrated by the case of Crowell v. Benson.'1 4 Leaving out
of account certain unique and complicating factors, the case was this: The
United States Employees' Compensation Commission has jurisdiction under
the Longshoremen's Act115 to award compensation for injuries arising within
the limits of federal admiralty jurisdiction. In this case it was disputed
whether an injured workman was actually employed at the time of injury,
and the Commission decided that he was. The Court held. that the fact of
employment was a "jurisdictional fact". If the man was employed the Com-
mission had jurisdiction; if he was not employed it did not. Accordingly,
due process of law required a judicial review of the Commission's finding
of this fact. The Court went further and held that the Court must not only
review the finding on the fact, but that it must try the issue of fact de novo.
This last appears to be out of harmony with earlier rulings on analogous
points but it is not relevant to our present purpose to analyze the case in
greater detail. We may conclude that provision for judicial review of com-
mission findings of jurisdictional facts is required on constitutional grounds."16
We may group together without specific label all other kinds of "facts".
The Interstate Commerce Commission finds as a fact that a carrier has
allowed a rebate to a shipper. The Federal Trade Commission finds that a
manufacturer has made a price agreement which obstructs fair competition.
These appear to be mere facts, neither constitutional nor jurisdictional, and
if they are determined by fair procedure and are supported by evidence they
are ordinarily beyond the reach of further judicial review. The independent
commissions carry on a steadily increasing volume of fact-finding which is
not subject to judicial review on the merits.
Judicial review of fact-finding by the commissions has taken two forms.
First, the courts, barring explicit statutory restriction, may try the issue
of fact de novo on appeal. In the early days the courts looked with suspicion
and jealousy upon the powers given to the regulatory commissions, and
Congress was by no means sure of its authority to place any limits upon the
judicial review of' commission fact-finding. Prior to the Hepburn Act of
1906, the laborious and expert "findings" of the Interstate Commerce Com-
-'285 U. S. 22 (1932).
"'Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, March 4, 1927, 44 STAT.
1424.
"This whole problem is discussed in Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson; .Tdicial Review of
Administrative Determination of Questions of "Constitutional Fact" (1932) 80 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 1055. See also Black, The "Jurisdictional Fact" Theory and Admin-
istrative Finality (1937) 22 CORNELL L Q. 349, 515.
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mission counted for little or nothing in the judicial review of the Commis-
sion's work. The courts did over again the Commission's job, and received
any new evidence which might be presented. Carriers deliberately withheld
evidence in hearings before the Commission in order to produce it as new
evidence in court on review. The prestige of the Commission was destroyed
by the fact that there was no point or issue upon which its decision was
final. 17 Under the Hepburn Act a second mode of review gradually emerged.
By 1912 the Supreme Court was following the rule that orders of the Com-
mission would be set aside only for mistakes of law, arbitrary action, or lack
of substantial evidence in support of fact determinations." 8 One of the
major grounds of attack on the ill-fated Commerce Court set up in 1910
was its stubborn insistence upon reverting to the trial de novo in reviewing
Commission orders.119 At the present time there is no regulatory commission
whose findings of fact are not treated as conclusive if supported by sub-
stantial evidence, and the courts will not themselves hear new evidence upon
review. Congress has in most cases required by law that this measure of
respect shall be accorded to the findings of the commissions. Even in the
absence of statute the courts would follow this rule in order to avoid the
burdensome task of doing over again the commissions' most exacting labors.
ii. Judicial review of commission methods and procedure
Judicial scrutiny extends not merely to the conclusions of the commissions
but to their methods of reaching those conclusions. Their procedure must,
in the first place, meet the requirements of due process of law. Just what
these are will vary in some degree with the nature of the power being exer-,
cised or the rights being regulated. In all cases -there is an essential minimum
comprising notice and hearing and a variety of procedural steps deemed
necessary to a fair and open determination of the rights involved. It is not
necessary for our purpose to catalog these elements. A commission must,
in the second place, follow all statutory mandates as to procedure. These
may be elaborate and may go beyond the requirements of due process of
law. In many cases Congress allows the commission to formulate its own
rules of procedure. In all cases, however, the commission must follow what-
ever statutory directions there are and the courts will review its procedure to
make sure that it has done so. The recent cases involving the procedure of
the Secretary of Agriculture in administering the Packers and Stockyards
Act raised questions as to whether the Secretary had fully complied with
"IMcFARLAND, op. cit. supra note 98, at 105-114; 1 SHARFAMAN, INTERSTATE COZ MaRCn
CommissioN (1931) 24 ff.
"'Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R., 222 U. S. 541 (1912).11l SHARFMAN, INTERSTATE COMMERCE ComMissioN (1931) 65-69.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the procedural requirements imposed by statute. 20 In the third place, where
a commission has been authorized by Congress to set up its own rules of
procedure, it will be required by the courts to adhere to them until they are
modified in the regular way. It will not be permitted to improvise other pro-
cedure. Such rules, issued under statutory authorization, acquire the force
of law. 121 The commission can change the procedure, therefore, only by first
changing the rules.
Judicial scrutiny of commission procedure goes beyond examination of
mere compliance with technical rules. It extends to the essential fairness
of the entire proceeding. As it is possible to give a person a grossly unfair
trial without deviating from any of the technical requirements of criminal
procedure, so a regulatory commission may act unfairly and at the same
time abide by every formal procedural requirement. Unfairness may take
the form of the suppression of evidence, or any mark of bias. The courts
will set aside as a denial of due process of law a result reached through a
procedure technically correct but nevertheless characterized by prejudice or
unfairness.1 22
3. Unsolved problems as to the range of judicial control of independent
regulatory commissions
The range of judicial control over the commissions is not governed by a
set of fixed rules. A minimum of judicial supervision is required by the
Constitution, but since this is defined by the courts themselves it is by no
means immutable. Beyond this there are substantial elements of flexibility in
the extent of judicial control. Since this has important effects upon the
administrative process, there is practical value in studying the factors which
tend to enlarge or contract it.
The courts control in large measure the range of their supervisory author-
ity by keeping flexible and in some cases vague the principles under which
it is exercised. For example, the courts hold that "jurisdictional facts" must
be reviewed. But close analysis discloses no precise line between jurisdictional
facts and other facts which commissions must determine. In Crowell v.
Benson 2" the fact of the employment relationship was held to be jurisdic-
tional. But in the same way most of the other facts which the commission
determines can be looked upon as jurisdictional if the courts wish to regard
'Supra note 26. See also Wichita R. & Light Co. v. P. U. Comm., 260 U. S. 48 (1922).
'United States ex rel. Denney v. Callahan, 54 App. D. C. 61, 294 Fed. 992 (1924),
holds that the rules of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia have the
force of law and must, therefore, be followed by the Board.
'Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8 (1908) ; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.
S. 465 (1920).
'Supra note 114.
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them so.'2 Furthermore, we have seen that the courts pass judgment upon
the essential fairness of the procedure used by a commission. If the court
gains an impression of good faith and scrupulous adherence to sound pro-
cedural rules, it maintains an attitude of aloofness, confining its review to
the constitutional or statutory minimum. But if the subtle evidences of fair-
ness and impartiality are lacking and the court finds that evidence has been
carelessly or prejudicially handled, it may extend its supervision to the point
of virtually doing over again the administrative tasks. This was the Supreme
Court's attitude toward the Federal Trade Commission during its earlier
years, when the Court felt that the findings of the Commission supporting
its orders were not full and fair deductions from the evidence but were
mere rationalizations of conclusions reached when the complaints charging
unfair competition were filed.' 25 The courts have not been reluctant to exer-
cise such control as they deem essential to the full protection of the rights of
those affected by the regulatory process. Their point of view is expressed in
the oft-quoted comment of Mr. Justice Harlan:
"The courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so restrained by tech-
nical rules that they could not find some remedy, consistent with the
law, for acts, whether done by the government or by individual persons,
that violated . . . justice or were hostile to the ...principles devised
for the protection of the essential rights of property." 126
The practical implications of this judicial attitude are clear. The courts
will not stand by and see a job of regulation sd bungled by a commission or
administrative officer that private rights are inadequately protected. They
will inject themselves into the picture and assume revisory and *controlling
power to the extent necessary to protect such rights. If we desire to confine
the courts to a minimum of participation in the administrative process, we
must see that that process in the hands of the commissions is so perfected as
to safeguard private rights without judicial intrusion. If the commissions
earn judicial respect they will be given a wide range of immunity from
judicial interference. If they do not command that respect they will be "re-
viewed" practically to the point of being superseded by the courts.
There are two points of view as to the proper range of judicial review of
commission action. Many believe that the maximum judicial supervision
should be required by statute. This would mean full review by the courts
of commission determinations of both law and facts. It is urged that the
weakest part of the work of the commissions lies in the finding of facts and
'Mr. Justice Brandeis emphasized this in his dissenting opinion in Crowell v. Benson,
285 U. S. 22, 73-4 (1932).
HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISsION (1925) Ch. III.
'Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 195 (1910).
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that unrestricted judicial review is the only way adequately to protect private
rights. This position was taken by the Committee on Administrative Law
of the American Bar Association in its report in 1936.127 In contrast to this
there is the view that the quasi-judicial commissions are the most efficient
agencies for the handling of their complex and difficult tasks, that the courts
are not qualified to make technical findings of fact, and that we should there-
fore strive to make commission methods so efficient and so solicitous of
private rights that judicial review may be safely held to the minimum. 28
With this second viewpoint I emphatically agree.129
CONCLUSION
This analysis of the constitutional status of the independent regulatory
commissions has aimed to be factual rather than critical. It has not seemed
useful to discuss here whether that status ought to be different from what
it is. The doctrine of the separation of powers might convincingly have been
interpreted so as to make the commissions unconstitutional. It has not been
so interpreted, it is not likely to be, and this study neither urges such an inter-
pretation nor concerns itself with inferences or consequences which might
flow from it. Nor does this analysis seek to reach any major conclusions of
policy regarding the commissions. The power to create a commission is one
thing; the wisdom of creating one is a wholly different thing. It may be
desirable to give the President more control over the commissions than
Congress is required by the Constitution to allow. These questions are
foreign to the present inquiry. Our constitutional findings may be sum-
marized as follows:
-(1936) 61 A. -B. A. REP. 720-794.
'This point "of view is reflected in the provisions of the Logan bill (S. 3676, 75th
Cong. 3d Sess.) providing for the establishment of a United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for Administration to review final orders and decisions of federal administrative
authorities and tribunals. Section 11 provides:
"The review by the court shall, be limited to questions of law, and the findings of
fact of the commission, administrative authority, or tribunal, if supported by sub-
stantial evidence, shall be conclusive."
='The two divergent viewpoints as to the legitimate scope of judicial review of admin-
istrative action are clearly presented in a recent case in the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia involving review of a Patent Office rejection of an application for
patent, Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. Coe, December 29, 1938. The majority
reviewed the issue on the merits and reversed the Patent Office. This the statute clearly
permitted. The able dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Edgerton stresses the importance
of according to the expert findings of the Patent Office a presumption of correctness. He
said: "The rule that the Patent Office should be sustained unless it is clearly wrong is
peculiarly appropriate to the question of invention. . . . Usually, as in the present case,
a distinct science or technical specialty is involved; and . . . expertness in' the special
field is, to put it mildly, a great advantage." He quoted from Judge Mack, Gold v.
Gold, 237 Fed. 84, 86 (C. C. A. 7th 1916) : " . . . it is just such questions that the
administrative tribunal is preeminently qualified to solve. Even then, of course, the court
is not absolved from the duty of examination; but, unless it be perfectly clear that the
final administrative body ... erred, relief should not be granted .... .
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
First, the doctrine of the separation of powers, as judicially developed,
does not prevent the creation of hybrid governmental agencies, (a) in which
legislative, executive and judicial powers are merged, (b) to which legis-
lative powers are delegated and judicial powers granted, (c) which straddle
the boundary lines of the three branches of government, and (d) which
cannot be classified as clearly legislative, executive or judicial.
Second, Congress may, but need not, place the performance of quasi-
judicial and quasi-legislative functions beyond the reach of the President's
executive control through his discretionary removal power.
Third, Congress cannot constitutionally withdraw from the President's
executive control agencies to which it gives executive duties, duties which
could not be made the exclusive work of an agency independent of Presi-
dential control.
Fourth, the President retains considerable authority to "take care that the
laws be faithfully executed" in the power to remove for cause the members
of agencies which have been protected against his discretionary removal.
Fifth, a minimum range of judicial supervision of the independent com-
missions is required by the Constitution. The courts extend this control
when they feel that the protection of private rights demands it, but sound
commission organization and procedure tend to keep it at the minimum.
